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Chapter 10
Sentencing and penal decision-
making: is Scotland losing its 
distinctiveness?
Cyrus Tata
Introduction
It is widely argued that the practice of punishment is changing 
profoundly in western countries. Against a background of increasing 
public cynicism, fear of crime, heightened insecurity and a loss of 
faith in legal and political institutions, it seems that in the last two 
decades traditional penal values are being replaced by new ones 
(Garland 2001). This new penal world may well cause us concern. 
As voters demand better value for money from the criminal justice 
system, there appears to be less concern with the rights of the 
individual and more concern with system efficiency. So, increasingly, 
you can expect to be punished not for any offence you may or may 
not have actually committed, but for what predictive risk-assessment 
technologies calculate you may probably do. As public trust in the 
wisdom of judges and other professionals further declines, it seems 
that sentences will increasingly be decided not on the basis of an 
assessment of you as a person but in accordance with ‘actuarial justice’ 
using predetermined scoring systems (rather like how insurance 
company actuaries calculate probable risks to determine premiums). 
Sentencing in Scotland is said to be illustrative of these major global 
shifts. Is it?
This chapter examines the hypothesis that the basic values of 
Scottish sentencing (and associated penal decision-making) are 
changing. It asks if Scotland is losing its traditional identity (based on 
a tradition of humanistic penal values1), and whether sentencing and 
penal practices in Scotland exemplify a trend towards international 
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convergence. In doing so, the chapter also raises issues about legal 
and social inequality and their inter-connection. 
In order to test these questions the chapter examines the evidence in 
Scottish sentencing and penal decision-making of three fundamental 
shifts. First, from the value of protecting the individual from the power 
of the state to ‘efficiency’. We will look at changes in how defence 
lawyers are paid and the impact of this on the protection of the 
individual accused by the state (‘due process’). Is Scotland forfeiting 
its traditional commitment to ‘due process’ in favour of a rough-and-
ready speedy throughput of cases (‘efficiency’)? Secondly, we will 
investigate whether Scotland is sacrificing its traditional dedication 
to welfare-based penal values to the altar of ‘actuarial justice’ (Feeley 
and Simon 1994), dominated by probabilistic calculations of the risk 
of future offending. Thirdly, we will examine whether or not the 
discretion of Scotland’s judiciary as to how to interpret and apply 
the law and thus decide cases is being diminished by the rise of 
technocratic instruments. Before examining these three areas, however, 
let us briefly define what is meant by ‘sentencing’ and then place it 
in its Scottish legal and institutional context.
The ambit of sentencing
Sentencing is the decision as to how to allocate state-imposed 
punishment in individual cases. Judicial decisions in court are 
traditionally thought of as sentencing, but in fact there are a 
number of other processes which, in effect, decide or influence the 
allocation of state punishment. These include, for example, decisions 
by prosecutors whether and how to prosecute a case, decisions 
whether to offer diversionary out-of-court penalties as an alternative 
to prosecution through court, decisions of the accused individual 
whether and when to plead ‘not guilty’ or ‘guilty’ and to what, 
reports prepared to advise and assist judicial sentencing, as well as 
‘back-door’ release arrangements from prison (see Chapter 11, this 
volume). All of these contribute to and are, in effect, a part of the 
sentencing process. For instance, prosecution choices as to whether 
and how to prosecute a person and in turn their decisions how to 
plead set the agenda for judicial sentencing. This chapter is written 
for readers relatively unfamiliar with Scottish sentencing and penal 
processes, therefore some of its distinctive legal features will now be 
briefly outlined. 
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Sentencing in Scotland: England and Wales, it isn’t!
Although a constituent part of the UK, Scotland’s legal system is 
separate and distinct from the rest of the UK (see Chapter 1, this 
volume). Scottish criminal law, justice institutions and procedures 
have always been separate. For instance, in contrast to England 
and Wales, most cases are heard not by lay magistrates but by 
‘sheriffs’, who are lawyers by professional background. Unlike a 
federal system (where serious matters are dealt with at national 
court level and other matters are required to be dealt with by the 
constituent states), there is no UK-wide sentencing system. Appeals 
directly about criminal law and justice are heard within Scotland and 
(unlike the rest of the UK), not by the the UK Supreme Court. In 
contrast to its counterpart in England and Wales (Ashworth 2005), 
the Court of Criminal Appeal in Scotland has (at least to-date) been 
relatively reluctant to issue Guideline Judgments which first-instance 
sentencers are obliged to follow. Neither does Scotland have the 
sentencing policy institutions of the kind developed in England and 
Wales and elsewhere (Ashworth, 2005, 2008). Save for murder, there 
are no mandatory sentences which judges must impose. Traditionally, 
the Scottish senior judiciary has been highly suspicious of developing 
any ‘policy’ on sentencing, arguing that the existence of any policy 
would undermine the principles of judicial independence and 
individualised justice in which every case is said to be ‘unique’ 
and dealt with as such. Similarly, the idea of any public position on 
‘tariffs’ or ‘going rates’ for different kinds of cases has largely been 
eschewed (Hutton 2006). In short, it makes no practical sense to talk 
of ‘the UK sentencing system’. 
The long-standing separateness of Scottish sentencing law and 
justice is important for three reasons. First, the point is very often 
completely overlooked or misunderstood by otherwise excellent 
textbooks on criminology and criminal justice which treat England 
and Wales as synonymous with ‘the UK’ (see further McAra 2008; 
and Chapter 1, this volume). Secondly, there are obvious and fruitful 
comparisons to be drawn between these two close neighbours, which 
are broadly similar yet also quite distinct. Thirdly, it has been quite 
widely argued that until devolution in 1999 Scottish criminal justice 
had resisted many of the globalising trends towards ‘efficiency’, risk 
management and technocratic automation. Instead, Scotland was said 
to have ‘retained a distinctively welfare approach’ (Croall 2006: 589) 
and to have been ‘relatively immune from the populist tendencies 
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that were rapidly infecting its southern neighbour’ (Cavadino and 
Dignan 2006: 231; cited by Croall 2006: 590). However, it has been 
argued that since devolution things have changed and that Scottish 
criminal justice is losing its distinctiveness.
Is Scotland’s distinctive sentencing identity being  
‘detartanised’?
In an important article, Lesley McAra (2008) has suggested that Scottish 
criminal justice may, as she neatly puts it, be being ‘detartanised’ 
(see also Chapters 1, 4 and 13, this volume). Rather than shoring 
up distinctiveness, devolution and the establishment of a Scottish 
Parliament (intended to democratise matters which had previously 
been dealt with by a small group of officials in the Scottish Office) 
has led to the greater politicisation of criminal justice and a degree 
of convergence with global trends (McAra 2008; Croall 2006). This 
chapter examines this thesis in the context of sentencing. Is Scotland’s 
sentencing practice now converging with other broader global trends 
towards efficiency, risk-based punishment and the loss of judicial 
discretion to technology? Are small countries (like Scotland) being 
swept along with the tide of actuarial justice? 
Much of the literature which has identified large-scale changes 
in values is inspired by evidence of significant change in policy, 
legislation and media discourse. Yet it cannot be assumed that policies, 
laws and the way the media talks about criminal justice filter down 
from ‘the top’ to everyday practices (Gelsthorpe and Padfield 2003; 
Tata 2007b). Sometimes they do filter down as intended, sometimes 
only partially; sometimes they are ignored or misunderstood (whether 
deliberately or through ignorance), and sometimes they work out in 
very different ways from that intended. For that reason we will now 
examine policy and actual practices in three case study areas: plea 
decision-making, pre-sentence reports and the use of information 
technology in sentencing. 
From due process to efficiency?2 Case study: plea decision- 
making
The ‘due process model’ of criminal justice is a short-hand term for 
a cluster of values and principles emphasising the need to protect 
each individual citizen from the abuse of state power. It is, after 
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all, the state which prosecutes the individual and seeks to punish 
him/her. Inspired by the classical liberal-legal suspicion of the state, 
due process is preoccupied with the vulnerability of the individual 
when confronted by the overwhelming might of the state. In the due 
process model the presumption of innocence is of paramount value. 
This means that the burden of proof lies with the state to prove 
the guilt of the individual. It is not for the individual to prove his/
her innocence. According to this model the decision to plead ‘not 
guilty’ or ‘guilty’ must be made by the individual as a matter of 
free and informed choice, without pressure or intimidation of any 
kind. The individual has to be given a fair chance of defence against 
the potentially crushing weight of the state system. The ‘efficiency 
model’, on the other hand, is a short-hand term for cluster of values 
which stress the need for the state to get through its huge volume of 
cases as quickly and as efficiently possible. The efficiency model is 
preoccupied with resource pressures of time and money. Cases should 
not take up more time than absolutely necessary. Accordingly, where 
people might end up pleading guilty, they should be encouraged 
to do so as early as possible, and it is acceptable (even sensible) 
to encourage ‘appropriate’ pleas of guilty through rewards and 
incentives. This model emphasises the routine and standard character 
of cases. 
Although a fully contested trial before a jury is the iconic 
image in the popular imagination of criminal justice, it is, in fact, 
statistically speaking a remarkably rare event. In common with other 
English-speaking countries, such fully contested jury trials in which 
prosecution and defence battle it out until the bitter end constitute 
less than 1 per cent of all cases prosecuted in court. Why is this? 
In Scotland there is no right for the defendant to choose to be tried 
by a jury and all such decision are taken by prosecutors, often as a 
matter of discretion (Moody and Tombs 1982). Only around 3 per 
cent of cases prosecuted are decided (‘marked’) by prosecutors as 
jury-triable. As in other English-speaking countries, around 97 per 
cent of cases prosecuted through the court are marked for ‘summary’ 
(non-jury triable) procedure and less than one tenth of these cases 
culminate in a fully contested trial (Tata and Stephen 2006). However, 
it is not the case that these summary cases have little at stake or 
should be regarded as ‘trivial’ (McBarnet 1981). The summary sheriff 
courts now have the power to imprison for up to 12 months and 
nearly nine-tenths of all custodial sentences are now passed in 
these courts (Scottish Government 2009). In other words, summary 
process matters: it may not be the stuff of courtroom movies, but 
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it has real consequences for those individuals called before it. From 
the perspective of public policy it is central, particularly in those 
cases in which a custodial sentence is a distinct possibility but by no 
means inevitable. Given that this chapter is looking both at policy 
and the typical, we will now mainly focus on summary process at 
the intermediate Sheriff Court-level and the decision as to how to 
plead. 
Although not formally a sentencing decision as such, the decision 
of an accused person how to plead (guilty or not guilty or some 
combination of the two) is in practical terms a crucial part of the 
sentencing process for those who are convicted. 
Plea decision-making
Since at least the early 1990s successive governments have been 
interested in making the Scottish criminal justice process quicker, 
simpler and more cost-effective. In other words, the aim has been to 
shift from the values of the due process model towards the efficiency 
model. Chief among the concerns has been to cut waste from the 
system by speeding up court cases and encouraging people who 
are seen as likely to end up pleading guilty to do so as quickly as 
possible. This brings the choice of the individual as to how to plead 
to the centre-stage of policy.
It is a fundamental principle of law that the decision as to how to 
plead belongs to the accused. No explicit or subtle pressure should 
interfere with that free choice. In this way, the role of the defence 
lawyer is not to interfere with that choice but to be ‘instructed’ 
by his/her client and legal advice is given only in the client’s best 
interests. Changes to the ways lawyers are paid should not, therefore, 
affect how cases are handled and the overall flow of cases. However, 
this ‘consumer sovereignty model’ is rather wide of the mark. Tata 
and Stephen explain further: 
[T]he empirical literature on the relationship between criminal 
defence lawyers and their clients around the English-speaking 
world has consistently highlighted the relative passivity of most 
clients […] Moreover, the relatively weak social, educational 
and economic resources of most clients in summary proceedings 
coupled with the immediate stress and anxiety which the 
criminal process brings means that clients tend to be in a 
particularly poor position to take firm command of their defence 
[…] Earlier research [suggests that] many clients tended to have 
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some difficulty accurately explaining the charges against them 
(or indeed those amended charges to which they chose to plead 
guilty). Furthermore, clients tended to conflate legal culpability 
with moral culpability. Most clients were willing to place their 
trust in their defence solicitor and take his/her advice […] 
These recent findings from Scotland provide further evidence 
that a simple market-style consumer-sovereignty model of client 
satisfaction and criminal legal services is flawed […] Pleading 
decisions, therefore, may ultimately be taken by clients, but they 
are heavily influenced and guided by the advice they receive; and 
shaped by expectations and agenda setting which are mediated 
by their [legal] advisors. (Tata and Stephen 2006: 733)
Contrary to the portrayal in US TV dramas, extremely few summary 
cases in Scotland are defended by lawyers who are paid privately 
by their clients. Most such work is conducted by defence lawyers 
working in private firms which then bill the publicly funded arm’s 
length government body called the Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB). 
What impact does this arrangement have? 
In 1999 Scotland decided to move from a system in which defence 
firms itemised their bills according to the time spent and the type of 
work carried out to a new system of ‘fixed fees’ in which the defence 
lawyer’s firm was to be paid an overall fee for completing the case. 
The idea behind the change was to make the system more efficient by 
discouraging defence lawyers from undertaking ‘unnecessary’ work, 
such as ‘excessive’ client contact and preparation and to save the 
cost of trials compared with early guilty pleas. Defence lawyers were 
to be paid a fixed amount depending on when the case concluded. 
Activities like case preparation and client contact were no longer to 
be paid as separate items. Proponents of the new fixed-fee policy 
felt that defence lawyers had been exploiting the system for profit 
(‘milking the system’, as it was often alleged). It was also believed 
that defence lawyers had a vested interest in prolonging cases, 
thus making the system less efficient. The government and SLAB 
believed that under a system of fixed fees defence lawyers would 
only undertake (and thus bill for) work which was truly necessary 
(Tata 2007a). 
Did the change to fixed payments work as intended? An 
independent evaluation was undertaken which investigated the 
impact of the change in the payment system on overall legal aid 
spending, lawyer firm incomes, case preparation and management, 
and the trajectories and outcomes of cases (Tata and Stephen 2006; Tata 
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2007a). Overall, the policy had very mixed results. Detailed economic 
analysis showed that it did not cut spending. Those specialist firms 
which were prepared to work more intensively by taking on more 
cases than they did before and spending less time per case found 
they could make a very significant income from the new scheme. 
In that sense, it was suggested by some lawyers that the new fee 
arrangements permitted, even encouraged, a new kind of exploitation 
(or ‘milking’), where defence lawyers were prepared to take on more 
cases. Overall, case preparation levels declined as a direct result of 
the new fee structure and this was not offset by systematic advance 
disclosure to the defence of prosecution evidence. (Previously the 
defence had subcontracted its own investigations.) Most damagingly 
of all to the policy, it had the net effect of postponing the point at 
which people pled guilty – the exact opposite of what was intended. 
This latter finding was partly due to another consequence of the 
policy: a reduction in levels of lawyer–client contact. Officials believed 
that, generally speaking, defence lawyers spent (and billed for) too 
much time in communication with their clients. By introducing fixed 
fees, lawyer–client contact was, in effect, financially discouraged. 
But this also meant that lawyers tended to have less time to speak 
to their clients to persuade them that pleading guilty at the earliest 
opportunity might be in their best interests. 
A closely related factor in encouraging ‘appropriate’ early guilty 
pleas is the connection with certain forms of ‘plea bargaining’. Plea 
bargaining (or ‘plea negotiation’) is an informal (and controversial) 
practice which exists in many (but not all) countries. Plea bargaining 
is an umbrella-term encompassing a range of practices whereby the 
accused gives up his/her right to trial and pleads guilty in (explicit 
or implicit) exchange for some perceived benefit (see, for example, 
Roach Anleu 2010: 154–62). There are two main forms of plea 
bargaining which operate in Scotland. First, ‘charge bargaining’ is a 
practice whereby the prosecution and defence agree which charges to 
amend or delete in exchange for a guilty plea by the accused person 
to the remaining charge(s). The second form is ‘implicit sentence 
bargaining’ whereby the defence offers a guilty plea in the hope of a 
reduced sentence compared with the sentence which would be passed 
for the same charge(s) if the person was to be found guilty after a 
trial. In Scotland sentence bargaining is implicit: the judge does not 
participate in any explicit discussions about the likely sentencing 
outcome if the individual pleads guilty and how this may or may not 
differ from the likely sentencing outcome if the individual is found 
guilty of the same charges after trial. 
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In Scotland implicit sentence bargaining, tends to be called ‘sentence 
discounting’. Arguments in favour of sentence discounting centre 
around efficiency: that it accelerates the production of ‘inevitable’ 
guilty pleas and so frees up court time. 
The most prominent argument against the idea of sentence 
discounting is based on due process values. The big question is 
whether people are ‘induced’ to plead guilty to charges they are not 
guilty of. This danger of inducement to plead guilty has traditionally 
weighed more strongly in Scotland than in England and Wales. For 
example, in the case of Strawhorn, the Scottish Court of Criminal 
Appeal made the point forcefully:
In this country there is the presumption of innocence and an 
accused person is entitled to go to trial and leave the Crown to 
establish his guilt if the Crown can. It is wrong therefore that 
an accused person should be put in a position of realising that 
if he pleads guilty early enough he will receive a lower sentence 
than he otherwise would receive for the offence. (Strawhorn v. 
McLeod 1987 SCCR: 413)
This did not mean that there was a ‘ban’ on discounting the sentence 
in implicit return for a guilty plea. Rather, it meant that there was 
to be no policy of discounting: it would all depend on the facts, 
circumstances and timing of the guilty plea in the individual case. 
Moreover, research which analysed the sentencing outcomes of a 
controlled sample of otherwise similar cohorts of cases suggested that 
there was no major and systematic practice of sentence discounting 
across the board in Scotland other than in certain categories of cases 
(notably sexual offences) (Goriely et al. 2001).
However, in 2003 the Court of Criminal Appeal in Scotland took 
the opportunity in the case of Du Plooy (Du Plooy v. HMA 2003 
SCCR: 443) to issue a rare ‘Guideline’ sentencing judgment. Du Plooy 
has retained the permissive position of Strawhorn: sentencers may 
discount a sentence in recognition of an early guilty plea. The crucial 
change was to be one of greater transparency. The sentencing judge 
should state openly whether a discount is applied, how much it is and 
his/her reasons for choosing not to apply a discount (which can be up 
to around one third). The rationale for this new approach was based 
on a desire for greater efficiency: to accelerate guilty pleas (Leverick 
2004). The logic is that in the course of time defence lawyers would 
come to know how to advise their clients because the lawyers would 
be able to predict what sort of discount the client should expect for 
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an early guilty plea and thus advise the client accordingly. However, 
knowledge of sentencing discount case law appears to be patchy. 
Moreover, some practitioners appear to believe that discounting is 
mandatory in all cases of an early guilty plea, while some judicial 
sentencers may harbour their own personal policies regarding certain 
categories of offences as not entitled to consideration of a discount at 
all (Tata 2007a). So the efficiency drive of sentence discounting can 
and does encounter counterveiling local practices which may lead 
to inefficiency, such as ‘unnecessary adjournments’ as the result of 
perceived inconsistencies between judicial sentencers, known as ‘sheriff 
shopping’ (Summary Justice Review Committee 2004: 31 and 208–9).
This brief case study of plea decision-making shows that in 
recent years there has been in Scotland, at the level of law and 
policy, some discernible shift towards a more explicit emphasis on 
efficiency values. Readers familiar with several decades of criminal 
justice research from around the world will know that the heavy 
dependence of Scottish summary justice on guilty pleas is found in 
many other English-speaking adversarial jurisdictions.3 However, in 
reality there are, as McBarnet (1981), famously observed, ‘two tiers 
of justice’: the iconic fully contested but rare jury trial, and the daily 
grind of summary justice based on relinquishment of the right to 
trial in return for some benefit (real or perceived). It is central both 
to the practical operation and to the legitimacy of the ‘adversarial’ 
criminal process that the decision as to how to plead is seen to be 
freely made by the accused person. However, in practice that choice 
is limited by a range of dynamics which work in partnership with 
legal aid and sentence discounting changes (for good introductions 
see, for example, Roach Anleu 2010: 154–62; Bottomley and Bronnit 
2006: 128–42). Research from several English-speaking countries has 
shown that guilty pleas are also driven through a range of practices, 
including a professional and policy ‘ideology of triviality’ which 
regards the outcomes of summary cases as relatively inconsequential 
(McBarnet 1981), ‘court workgroups’ and the incentives to maintain 
inter-professional relationships (for example, Eisenstein and Jacob 
1991), a pervasive culture of the presumption of guilt rather than 
of innocence (e.g. McConville et al. 1994; Mulcahay 1994; Sanders 
and Young 2007: 443–94), the deployment of judicial demeanour 
and displays of emotion (e.g. Roach Anleu and Mack 2005), the use 
of pre-sentence reports and associated processes to facilitate and 
maintain the ‘closure’ of guilty pleas (Tata 2010), and the deliberate 
use of adjournments by judicial officers to aid the facilitation of 
earlier guilty pleas (Roach Anleu and Mack 2009).
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Recent changes to legal aid and sentencing discount law and 
policy have sought to add to these dynamics and so achieve a further 
‘rebalancing’ in favour of efficiency values. While it seems that the 
summary courts in particular have long relied on a high rate of guilty 
pleas, what is new is that both legal aid and sentencing policy are 
now much more overt in seeking to encourage guilty pleas (wherever 
‘appropriate’) and as quickly as possible. Where Scottish sentence 
discounting law and legal aid policy were previously features which 
could be drawn on to support adversarial due process values in both 
policy and practice, they now appear to be relatively supportive of 
efficiency values. Nonetheless, these law and policy changes do not 
appear simply to be implemented on the ground in a straightforward 
way, but rather mesh with existing practices which may contradict 
efficiency goals. Is this more explicit drive towards ‘efficiency’ also 
found in other parts of the sentencing process? For instance, are pre-
sentence reports now more about risk-categorisation than about the 
individual person being sentenced?
From welfare to risk? Case study: pre-sentence reports
The prominent role of social work in criminal justice in Scotland is 
said to have been one of the key reasons for Scotland’s distinctive 
maintenance of penal welfarism at least before devolution (McAra 
2005; see also Chapter 11, this volume). Pre-sentencing reports are 
intended to inform, advise and assist the sentencing process. In 
Scotland such reports are known as Social Enquiry Reports (SERs). 
They place the convicted person in a broader context so that the 
judicial sentencer can be aware of the person’s physical and mental 
condition, character, attitude to the offence and offending behaviour 
and assess the suitability of non-custodial sentences. Reports are 
compiled on the basis of at least one interview with the person and 
sometimes on the basis of inquiries to other agencies (for instance to 
check facts) and home visits. 
Rather than being written by members of a national probation 
service (as in England and Wales) or by the employees of the 
sentencing court (as in the USA), in Scotland reports are compiled 
by generically trained social workers specialising in criminal justice 
and employed by local authorities. This may be significant in three 
respects. First, the fact that criminal justice social workers (CJSWs) 
are generically trained professional social workers may reflect and 
reinforce Scotland’s relative commitment to penal welfare values. 
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Secondly, the fact that CJSWs are not the direct employees of central 
government may mean that they are more able to resist the latest 
media-fuelled whims of government policy. Thirdly, the fact that 
CJSWs are not employed by the courts can bring a penal-welfare 
perspective to the sentencing process which is different (though 
potentially complementary) to law’s tendency to view offending as 
simply no more than individual rational choice. This difference can 
be a healthy thing. Welfare values explain offending by rooting it 
in the person’s personal and social circumstances and also in the 
relationships with family members. In this way, SERs can, where 
relevant, contextualise the individual’s offending within social 
conditions and serious social disadvantages, thus linking social and 
legal conceptions of justice together. This should not be the same 
thing as a ‘sob story’, but enables the sentencer to be aware of the 
impact of any sentencing decision not only on the individual, but 
also on their nearest and dearest, including children. 
Are these qualities of penal welfarism being diminished by policy 
changes? Partly, in an attempt to enhance the quality and consistency 
of report writing, National Standards for criminal justice social work 
were introduced from 1991 (see Chapter 11, this volume). These 
require a greater focus not only on the person but also their offending 
behaviour and risk to the public. Thus has the job of CJSWs become 
more one of control than of welfare – more about deeds than needs? 
Interestingly, a major reason for the introduction of National Standards 
was to try to encourage the more sparing use of custody by sentencers. 
The thinking of successive governments has been that if sentencers 
are better informed about both the person before them and about 
the potential of non-custodial sentences to reduce reoffending they 
would be more likely to think twice about a custodial sentence for 
someone who is not a danger to the public (Tata et al. 2008; McNeill 
and Whyte 2007). Thus the strategy of successive governments has 
been to avoid seeking to develop an explicit sentencing policy (since 
that would be seen as ‘interference’ by the judiciary), but rather to 
try to make both reports and non-custodial sentences more credible in 
the eyes of judicial sentencers. National Standards have tried to make 
reports ‘better’ by making them seem tougher and more offence/risk 
focused and by downplaying welfare narratives. What has been the 
result?
A major research study was conducted over four years to assess 
the ways in which reports are written and how those same reports 
are then interpreted and used by sheriff court judges (Tata, et al. 2008; 
McNeill et al. 2009). The research4 focused on summary court ‘cusp’ 
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cases – those cases which are in the balance between a custodial and 
a non-custodial sentence, which are exactly the types of cases with 
which the policy is particularly concerned. 
Through a range of techniques the intention of what report writers 
attempted to convey to the sheriff was elicited and then compared 
with how judges (and others) read, interpreted and used those same 
reports. Is government strategy of influence through advice and 
information working? Are report writers now concerned with risk 
assessment rather than welfarist values? 
The research found:
• SERs are central to the sentencing process in ‘cusp’ cases. Given 
pressures on the summary courts, where a person pleads guilty 
and so there is no trial, reports are commonly seen by lawyers and 
judges as the main voice of the accused person. 
• SERs are written in a form of code because report writers are 
expected both to provide an assessment and evaluation and 
yet not to be explicitly judgmental. SERs have to be ‘relevant’ 
to sentencing, but at the same time they must not appear to be 
‘directive’. SERs are expected to be the main policy vehicle for the 
promotion of non-custodial sentences and yet they cannot do so 
explicitly. The result is that key messages in SERs are encoded. 
Often this works (i.e. the sentencing judge understands the code) 
but equally often the message is either skipped or interpreted very 
differently from that intended. 
• CJSWs tend reframe welfare values through the language of 
‘risk’ and ‘public protection’. Moreover, CJSWs (and especially 
judicial sentencers) are unconcerned by actuarial risk assessment 
instruments. Even though both CJSWs and judges complained 
about risk assessment instruments (see also Tombs 2008), when 
it came to dealing with actual cases in practice both professional 
groups were resistant to such instruments. 
• Although judicial sentencers greatly valued the presence of 
personal and social circumstance information so as to contextualise 
and humanise the person, in practice most (but not all) sentencing 
judges tended to skip-read that information and tended instead to 
focus on the end sections about the offence and the individual’s 
‘attitude to offence and offending’. This approach to reading 
reports has two effects. First, it undermines the requirement that 
the report builds up a narrative assessment – thus, for example, 
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reports were sometimes criticised by sentencers because the 
conclusion lacked ‘logic’. Secondly, it means that narratives about 
serious disadvantage are marginalised. 
• A frequent criticism made by judicial sentencers of reports is that 
they are not sufficiently ‘realistic’ about sentencing and that this 
damages their credibility. However, from the perspective of CJSWs 
it can sometimes be very difficult to know what is ‘realistically’ 
on the sentencing agenda. Even in the same courthouse, different 
sentencing judges can take quite different approaches to what is 
‘realistic’. The problem for CJSWs is that they often do not know 
which judge will read the SER. In any event, there is also the issue 
of the ethics of altering the SER for a particular sentencer. 
Thus in Scottish report writing ‘old’ narratives of penal-welfare 
appear to mesh together with ‘new’ narratives of risk. Furthermore, 
the risk discourse appears to have limited direct impact on sentencing 
decision-making and the policy of trying to encourage sentencers to 
use custody more sparingly through the provision of ‘better’ quality 
reports is undermined by the fact that what judicial sentencers want 
from reports varies. Thus report ‘quality’, as defined by judicial 
sentencers, is something of a moving target (Tata et al. 2008). Thus, 
while there has been clear evidence of a shift in law and policy away 
from welfare and towards actuarial risk-assessment, an examination 
of practices in actual cases suggests a more complex and ‘hybridised’ 
picture (McNeill et al. 2009).
Sentencing reform and the slow death of judicial discretion?  
Case study: the sentencing information system
Is sentencing discretion being diminished by a move towards 
managerial control and the rise of technocratic instruments? Some 
leading commentators have argued that Scotland exemplifies an 
international trend in which techno-rational instruments are taking 
over the traditional humanistic values of judicial sentencing (Tombs 
2008; Franko Aas 2005). 
In her widely discussed account of sentencing and the global 
rise of actuarial-style justice, Katja Franko Aas identifies a marked 
diminution of judicial discretion. Judges are, she says, losing status 
and control. Where once judicial sentencers were concerned with 
unique individuals they are increasingly being compelled to base 
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their judgments on actuarial logic. One of the most important forces 
driving this change is the rise of information technology and its 
logics of abstraction, remoteness and standardisation. All of this is 
leading, Franko Aas argues, towards a radically reduced and one-
dimensional conception of justice about which we should be deeply 
concerned. In making this case, she frequently cites the introduction 
of a ‘Sentencing Information System’ (SIS) in Scotland as one of two 
main sources of evidence (the other being US federal guidelines), 
showing a fundamental shift not only in the discourse around 
sentencing policy but in sentencing practice itself. So let us briefly 
examine the history of the SIS (Tata and Hutton 2003; Miller 2004).
As seen above, unlike other western countries, sentencing in 
Scotland has, until recent years, been marked by an absence of 
any concerted attempts at reform and the use of the SERs outlined 
previously has been the main way in which successive governments 
have sought indirectly to influence the use of custody. There have 
been few attempts to introduce greater ‘structure’ and ‘accountability’ 
of the kind seen, for example, in England and Wales (e.g. Ashworth 
2005, 2008). This might be taken to mean that Scottish sentencing 
and the Scottish judiciary enjoy higher levels of public confidence 
than comparable countries. In fact, that is not the case. As in other 
countries, research into public opinion and attitudes to sentencing 
shows similar levels of public cynicism about sentencing and justice. 
However, in Scotland as elsewhere this is at least in large part due to 
a lack of knowledge about normal practices (Hutton 2005; Anderson 
et al. 2002). So why has Scotland not experienced the kinds of fairly 
significant reforms to sentencing structures as other countries like 
England and Wales, the USA, Canada, South Africa, Australia? Space 
constraints limit us to examining just one initiative spanning the 
1990s and early 2000s – a period when sentencing reforms developed 
apace elsewhere.
In the early 1990s, the Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland, 
Michael Forsyth, wanted to introduce mandatory minimum custodial 
sentences for certain types of cases (so-called ‘three strikes’ legislation). 
The senior judiciary at that time, concerned about such a move (or 
similar) developments which they believed might unduly restrict 
judicial discretion, responded with its own initiative: a Sentencing 
Information System (SIS) for the High Court. The idea was to harness 
database technology as a way of helping judges to pursue consistency5 
in sentencing. Crucially, however, the SIS would be created by judges 
for judges: it was a way of helping the judiciary to regulate itself 
and be seen to being doing so. It was not something which would 
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be imposed on judges by outsiders. Unlike US Federal Guidelines, 
the SIS was never intended to be directive, but to help to inform 
the judge’s decision-making process. In the spectrum of methods of 
sentencing reform, the Scottish SIS was to be ‘light-touch’.
In 1993 the senior judiciary approached academics at Strathclyde 
University Law School for help and it was agreed to establish a 
feasibility study and to develop a prototype. Taking such a proactive 
initiative is unusual for the (Scottish) judiciary. It was prominently 
and favourably reported in the media and the government, which 
funded the project, was content to allow the judiciary to take a lead. 
The SIS initiative was also often cited in response to calls to restrict 
judicial discretion. The SIS was partly a way of heading-off political 
pressure to ‘do something’ about sentencing. 
Implementation of the SIS was phased in during the 1990s and 
handed over to the Scottish Court Service (SCS) (which serves the 
courts and the judiciary) in 2003. At that time the SIS contained 
relatively in-depth information about 15,000 sentenced cases (including 
appeals) over the previous 15 years with information collected in a 
way agreed with the judiciary. The SIS is searchable in a way which 
affords the user a high degree of flexibility so that patterns of case 
similarity can be defined in a range of different ways (including 
both in aggregate terms and by examining individual cases). In 
other words, the SIS does not attempt to direct the judge to ‘the 
correct’ sentence, but rather offers a range of possible sentences. It 
was decided that, with the handover to the SCS, court clerks would 
take over recording of information. In the event, it became quickly 
apparent that the quality assurance processes recommended by the 
university team were not followed by the SCS and the entry of data 
after 2003 appears not to have been reliable. Foreseeably, the SIS 
appears to have been left to quietly wither away. Why? 
Probably the most important reason was that immediate political 
pressure on the judiciary dissipated – the SIS had fulfilled a 
tactical role to see off political pressure. In contrast to south of the 
border, in Scotland immediately post-devolution judicial sentencing 
discretion was not on the agenda. During that time and due to 
changes of personnel at the apex of the judiciary, High Court judicial 
enthusiasm for the SIS began to cool, and as a result progress to 
full implementation slowed. Although the Sheriffs Association (which 
represents intermediate court judges) suggested to the Scottish 
Parliament that it would be useful for sheriffs to have something 
similar (Scottish Parliament Justice 1 Committee 2003) (as did the 
later Review of Summary Justice 2005), it was clear that the 
211
Sentencing and penal decision-making in Scotland
senior judiciary of the High Court were now not so keen as their 
predecessors. 
The key underlying issue, which was never properly resolved, was 
who could have access to the SIS. The university team recommended 
public access, proposing that if managed in the appropriate way 
such access need not be a threat to the judiciary but an opportunity 
to improve public understanding of sentencing. For example, the 
SIS data could produce occasional reports about the true patterns 
of sentencing for different kinds of cases (Tata and Hutton 2003). 
However, nervous about access beyond the judiciary, coupled with 
an awareness that it would be difficult in the long term to continue 
to deny access, the simplest thing (given that political pressure had 
dissipated) would be to hope the whole thing could quietly be 
forgotten. That is what largely happened during the mid-2000s. But by 
the end of the decade, the new minority Scottish National Party (SNP) 
Government was seeking to pass the Criminal Justice and Licensing 
Bill which would create a presumption against custodial sentences of 
six months or less, and to build on the work of the earlier judicially 
led Sentencing Commission by creating a Sentencing Council which 
would have the power to develop sentencing guidelines. Meanwhile, 
Labour and the Conservatives have gone further and committed 
themselves to an explicit policy of mandatory minimum sentences 
for certain offences (notably knife-carrying). All these proposals have 
been strongly opposed by representations from the judiciary. One of 
the arguments against such ‘interference’ is that there is currently a 
dearth of systematic sentencing information available, including about 
the extent of any inconsistency. It is hard to escape the sense that 
we may, to some extent, be witnessing a cycle of history repeating 
itself.
So rather than being a technocratic instrument signalling the loss 
of judicial status and power, the story of the Scottish SIS signifies the 
opposite. It shows the ability of the Scottish judiciary, at least so far, 
to head off, at least temporarily, the threat of ‘interference’. 
Concluding comments
This chapter has sought to examine the extent to which Scottish 
sentencing is being swept along with the tide of broader worldwide 
changes, by exploring three key areas. First, there have been attempts 
by successive governments (both before and after devolution) to 
achieve greater efficiency by explicitly encouraging guilty pleas 
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where ‘appropriate’, and a softening of the law and policy emphasis 
on the presumption of innocence. However, these attempts have 
met with mixed success opn the ground. Secondly, we have asked 
whether Scottish sentencing is losing its distinctive emphasis on 
penal welfarism. Although headline policy has sought to achieve 
greater emphasis on ‘risk’ at the expense of ‘welfare’, evidence of 
a dramatic shift in pre-sentence reports is limited. This is not least 
because both CJSWs and judicial sentencers are somewhat suspicious 
of risk instruments and also because ‘risk’ is often invoked by CJSWs 
in defence of welfare narratives. Thirdly, the Scottish SIS does not 
exemplify the loss of judicial discretion and status. Far from it, the 
SIS was not imposed on judges but initiated and created by the senior 
judiciary to head off perceived political interference, and then quietly 
neglected when that threat was believed to have receded. 
Does this mean that Scotland is retaining its distinctiveness and 
not moving towards the global? In headline policy terms we can find 
instances of convergence (e.g. the increasing emphasis in policy on 
risk-assessment instruments and a new Risk Management Authority, 
national standards for CJSWs, the attempt to speed up guilty pleas, a 
renewed interest in sentencing reform). So there is evidence of some 
policy convergence. But evidence of actual practices on the ground 
is much thinner and more complex. That is not to say that policy 
talk does not matter (it does), but that actual practices should be 
expected to differ, adapt or resist official changes. As elsewhere, 
in-depth study of actual practices reveals that there tends to be a 
difference between official discourse and the reality of practice on 
the ground (for example, Cheliotis 2006; Tata 2007b; McNeill et al. 
2009). So there may be some globalisation of policy discourse, but we 
should not then imagine any simple trickle-down effect. This is more 
than saying that there is a big picture of globalisation with some little 
local variations. To build up ‘the big picture’ we also have to know 
what is happening on the ground rather than assume ‘top-down’ 
change is inevitable (McAra 2005; Tata 2007b). 
Notes
1 In this context, ‘humanistic penal values’ include: treating people not as 
inert categories to be processed, but as unique individual human beings; 
humane treatment; the avoidance of unnecessary punishment; human 
(rather than mechanical) forms of decision-making based on both rational 
and emotional sensibilities; judgment based on wisdom rather than a 
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strict or bureaucratic adherence to rules, policies or systems for their own 
sake; and, most importantly, treating people with respect as whole human 
beings of intrinsic value rather than as a means to an end.
2 Here the concepts of ‘due process’ and ‘efficiency’ are loosely borrowed 
from Packer (1964) which provides a simple way of starting to think 
about these issues. 
3 Briefly put, an ‘adversarial’ system is based on the idea that truth best 
emerges through a contest between two parties battling to put their side 
of the story. 
4 ESRC Award No. RB000239939.
5 In this context, ‘consistency’ means treating similar cases similarly and 
dissimilar cases dissimilarly. Importantly, ‘consistency’ does not mean 
‘uniformity’, i.e. treating all cases the same way regardless of their 
differences. Consistency is a matter of equality before the law. Simply put, 
the sentence should not depend on which judge you happen to get.
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